We theoretically and empirically evaluate Allport’s intrinsic-extrinsic and Batson’s quest religious orientations through the lens of self-determination theory (SDT) and Wulff’s social-cognitive model. Confirming our theoretical analysis, we find that Allport’s intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy fails to correspond empirically to the differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation within SDT. Whereas Allport’s intrinsic religious orientation was positively related to internalized extrinsic motivation, his two extrinsic (i.e., personal and social) religious orientations were not systematically related to any of the discerned motives within SDT. Furthermore, Batson’s quest orientation was unrelated to any of the SDT concepts but was positively related to symbolic disbelief. The present findings suggest that Allport’s motivational orientations model needs both refinement and relabeling to better fit with recent theoretical evolutions in the field of motivational psychology.

INTRODUCTION

Since the pioneering work of (Allport 1950; Allport and Ross 1967), dozens of articles have relied on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation (e.g., Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993; Donahue 1985). Later on (Daniel Batson 1976; Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993) introduced quest orientation to provide a fuller picture of the concept of mature religiosity. More than five decades after the initial introduction of Allport’s orientations, it seems time to reevaluate its theoretical adequacy in light of broader motivational frameworks. The overall aim of this study is to examine and, if needed, to reconsider Allport’s distinction through the lens of self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan 1985; Vansteenkiste, Ryan, and Deci 2008). SDT is a well-grounded and empirically validated macrotheory of motivation, which has been under development since Allport’s seminal work (e.g., Deci 1971). By mapping Allport’s concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation to the motivational concepts in SDT, we aimed to heed Kirkpatrick and Hood’s (1990:448) admonition that “a serious approach to researching the topic of motivation for religious involvement . . . should begin with a rich psychological theory of human motivation.”

Accordingly, one concern is whether Allport’s scales and Batson’s quest orientation deal with cognitive style, motivation, or a mix of both (Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990). Is Allport’s intrinsic...
religious orientation a cognitive style of approaching religion, or is Batson’s quest orientation more an articulation of this cognitive processing style? To examine this issue, we will relate Allport’s and Batson’s concepts first, to dimensions of religious cognitive style, as conceptualized within Wulff’s (1997) model of social-cognitive approaches toward religious contents, and second, to motivational concepts, as articulated by SDT. If Allport’s distinction turns out to be primarily motivational in nature, as argued by Gorsuch (1997), then we must question how the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation relates to the differentiated taxonomy of motivational regulations within SDT. These comparisons will allow us to shed light on the exact conceptual status of Allport’s and Batson’s concepts, which is the main goal of this study. We will begin by introducing Allport’s and Batson’s perspectives and then present the basic tenets of SDT and Wulff’s model.

**Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Quest Religious Orientation**

Allport’s (e.g., Allport 1966; Allport and Ross 1967) distinction between intrinsic (IR) and extrinsic religious orientation (ER) originated from Allport’s (1950) conceptualization of mature and immature religious sentiments. An intrinsically oriented person considers religion as an ultimate end in itself; it is a master motive in life. Religious beliefs and values (e.g., humility, compassion, etc.) are internalized “without reservation,” and other needs and goals are accommodated, reorganized, and brought in harmony with these religious contents. Importantly, an intrinsic religious orientation “floods the whole life with motivation and meaning” (Allport 1966:455). By contrast, an extrinsically oriented individual approaches religion in a utilitarian or instrumental fashion: it helps one to attain “self-centered” ends, such as safety, solace, or sociability. Furthermore, religion is lightly held, oversimplified, not reflected upon, and “not well integrated in the deeper life of the subject” (Allport 1950:59). Because an extrinsic religious orientation can serve either the pursuit and attainment of comfort, security, and protection or social contact, Kirkpatrick (1989) differentiated between an extrinsic-personal (Ep) and extrinsic-social (Es) orientation. One of the important ideas Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) raised is the “thorny issue” of bipolarity versus orthogonality of the intrinsic and extrinsic orientation. Allport originally conceptualized both orientations as bipolar opposites. However, most of the empirical work has shown that the intrinsic and both extrinsic orientations are relatively orthogonal.

(Batson 1976; Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993) argued that IR and ER overlooked several components of the original concept of mature religion, such as a well-differentiated, critical, flexible, and open-ended cognitive attitude in dealing with religious issues. In an attempt to operationalize these characteristics, Batson proposed “quest” as a third religious orientation. A quest orientation is expressed in (1) posing existential questions without reducing their complexity, (2) regarding doubt as important and positive, and (3) emphasizing tentativeness and incompleteness in formulating answers for religious questions. Given research findings that quest orientation generally fails to correlate with measures of religiosity, Donahue (1985) suggested that the quest scale measures agnosticism rather than a religious orientation. Countering this criticism, Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993) argued that quest does tap into a religious orientation based on their findings that religiously active people (e.g., seminarians) score higher on the quest scale relative to less religiously involved people (e.g., undergraduates with a moderate interest in religion).

In addition to Batson’s criticism that IR does not fully capture mature religiosity, Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) raised another important criticism pertaining to the conceptual clarity of the construct “religious orientation”: Is it a motivational concept, a cognitive construct, or a mix of both? To address this issue, we examined the association between IR, ER, and the quest orientation in light of the motivational subtypes, as distinguished within SDT, and the social-cognitive approaches toward religious contents, as articulated in Wulff’s model.
Self-Determination Theory

In SDT, intrinsic motivation refers to the enactment of an activity in the absence of external incentives; a behavior is performed for no other reason than the feelings of satisfaction and enjoyment it brings. For instance, when a person attends a seminar on a religious theme purely for personal feelings of interest and fulfillment, the activity is said to be intrinsically motivated. Within SDT, intrinsic motivation is considered the hallmark of autonomous functioning because intrinsically motivated people experience a sense of psychological freedom and volition.

Intrinsic motivation is differentiated from extrinsic motivation in that the latter pertains to carrying out an activity to attain an outcome that is separate from the activity itself (Lens 1997). Hence, the behavior is not performed for its own sake, but rather for a reason that lies outside that particular activity. Initially, extrinsic motivation was considered a nonautonomous type of motivation because people would by definition lack a sense of choice and volition when pursuing an outcome (e.g., rewards) that is separable from the activity itself (Harter 1981). However, empirical research (e.g., Ryan and Connell 1989) showed that extrinsic motivation is not necessarily characterized by a lack of autonomy and choice, depending on the degree to which the reason for performing the activity has been internalized (Ryan and Deci 2002). Internalization is defined as an active process through which behavioral regulations are gradually transformed into genuinely and authentically self-endorsed regulations (Grolnick, Deci, and Ryan 1997). As the reason for carrying out a behavior becomes more personally endorsed, the extrinsically motivated behavior will be experienced as relatively more autonomous. As a result, SDT does not treat extrinsic motivation as a homogeneous category that can be directly contrasted with intrinsic motivation but instead distinguishes four different types of extrinsic motivation, some of which are experienced as more controlling and others as more autonomous in nature.

The four types of extrinsic motivation are differentiated as follows. First, an extrinsically motivated (religious) behavior is externally regulated when it is forced by others or motivated by the promise of an incentive or the threat of a punishment. Because the behavior is controlled by external forces, the reason for enacting the behavior is not internalized at all; hence, the behavior will be performed under a sense of pressure. An adolescent who is expected to go to church by his parents and does not identify with these parental expectations to attend church is said to be externally regulated. Second, activities can be pressured from within, by internal demands, such as feelings of guilt, shame, or contingent self-worth, that is, a person performs the activity because one feels one should perform it. The external reasons for performing the activity have then been partially internalized or introjected. Going to church to avoid feelings of guilt for not doing so constitutes an example of introjected regulation. Because the reason for the behavior is not wholeheartedly endorsed but only partially taken in, an internal conflict will likely arise between those internally pressuring demands and other personal inclinations. Thus, just as in the case of external regulation, introjected regulation lacks a sense of psychological freedom and choice, and therefore both types of behavioral regulations are often combined under the concept of controlled motivation (e.g., Vansteenkiste et al. 2005).

A person is more likely to perform a behavior willingly when he or she identifies with the reason for the behavior. In the case of identified regulation, the behavior is perceived as personally relevant and is enacted out of genuine personal commitment. The behavior is now carried out because one genuinely finds it important to do so. Social work instigated by a strong identification with Christian core values such as “loving thy neighbor” represents an example of identified regulation. Because one has personally accepted the reason for performing the activity, the behavior is done with a greater sense of volition and psychological freedom. Full internalization occurs when the reason for enacting the behavior is integrated with other values and interests. Whereas identified regulation involves simply accepting the value of the activity as personally important, in the case of integrated regulation different personally important
behaviors are brought in alignment with one another so that they form a coherent whole. As a result, integrated regulation represents the most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation. Because integrated and identified regulation are difficult to disentangle through self-reports, for purposes of this study, we have combined them both under the label “internalized (extrinsic) motivation/regulation.”

The conceptual distinction between qualitatively different types of extrinsic motivation has been examined in several life domains, including the domain of religion (see Neyrinck, Lens, and Vansteenkiste 2005 for an overview). Research has shown that a more internalized behavioral regulation of religious behaviors is positively related to well-being, more frequent engagement in religious behaviors (Ryan, Rigby, and King 1993), and a more flexible approach to religious contents (Assor et al. 2005; Neyrinck et al. 2006). These findings have been reported in countries as diverse as Belgium, Israel, the United States, and Poland (Neyrinck et al. 2009).

Social-Cognitive Approaches Toward Religion

In addition to considering the motivation underlying religious behaviors, the question can be raised: “How are religious contents cognitively approached?” According to Wulff (1997), various approaches to religion can be depicted in a two-dimensional space, organized around two orthogonal bipolar dimensions. Hutsebaut and colleagues (see Duriez et al. 2007) developed the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS) to measure these two dimensions with respect to Christian belief contents. The first dimension, exclusion versus inclusion of transcendence, refers to the degree to which a transcendental reality as conceived within Christianity is thought to exist, or in other words, the degree to which the transcendent dimension is experienced or affirmed. Simply stated, a high score on the inclusion of transcendence dimension is characteristic of people who believe and who define themselves as religious. The second dimension, the literal versus symbolic dimension, refers to a rigid versus a more flexible interpretation of Christian religious contents. Whereas a symbolic approach to religion entails an open-minded processing of religious contents through critical and flexible reflection, a literal approach entails a more rigid, one-sided, and, hence, defensive view of Christian religious contents. Combining these two dimensions, Duriez, Soenens, and Hutsebaut (2005) distinguish four types of approaches toward religion: literal-inclusion, literal-exclusion, symbolic-inclusion, and symbolic-exclusion.

Because a symbolic (versus literal) interpretation of belief contents is related to individual differences in how open or defensive people are, this dimension has been found to be associated with (1) a greater exploration and more thorough processing of identity-relevant information, (2) a more empathic viewpoint toward others (i.e., a greater openness toward others’ experiences), (3) a greater tolerance of ambiguity (i.e., the experience of less aversion toward ambiguous situations devoid of closure), (4) less closed-mindedness (i.e., a willingness to confront one’s knowledge and beliefs with inconsistent evidence and alternative opinions), and (5) less ethnic prejudice (i.e., a positive, less prejudiced attitude toward minorities) (see Duriez et al. 2007 for an overview).

Present Research

The overarching aim of this study is to examine how Allport’s IR and ER orientations and Batson’s quest dimension map onto two well-established frameworks: SDT for conceptualizing and measuring motives for religiosity and Wulff’s model for cognitive processing of religious beliefs. Below, we formulate a set of specific predictions and explorative research questions that deal with the link between Allport’s IR/ER and Batson’s quest on the one hand, and SDT and Wulff’s model on the other.
Relating Allport and SDT

Different hypotheses regarding the relationships between Allport’s orientations and SDT’s behavioral regulations can be formulated. A superficial analysis of Allport’s intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientation distinction suggests that this pair of concepts can be directly equated with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation distinction within SDT. Hence, Allport’s IR should correlate positively with SDT’s intrinsic motivation, while both Ep and Es should correlate with all the different subtypes of extrinsic motivation. However, given that the concept of extrinsic motivation has been broken down into different subtypes within SDT, we propose a more refined set of hypotheses (Neyrinck, Lens, and Vansteenkiste 2005).

First, we predicted that Allport’s concept of IR should be most strongly related to SDT’s concept of internalized extrinsic motivation (Hypothesis 1). According to Allport, when a person scores high on IR, his religious beliefs and prescriptions are organized and integrated in the deeper life of the person, so that these religious beliefs are harmonious with his other needs and preferences (Allport and Ross 1967). This description closely corresponds to SDT’s concept of internalized regulation where individuals have personally endorsed their religious behaviors because they have personal significance to them and fit with their broader life values (Neyrinck, Lens, and Vansteenkiste 2005).

Second, based on the description of IR by Gorsuch (1997:13), IR might also be positively related to SDT’s concept of intrinsic motivation. Specifically, Gorsuch seemed to reframe IR in terms of intrinsic motivation when he characterizes IR as “the motivation for experiencing and living one’s religious faith for the sake of the faith itself,” or when he says that, in the case of IR, religion is “an end unto itself, a goal pursued in the absence of external reinforcement.” Notably, the idea that IR refers to performing religious behaviors out of the inherent appeal and satisfaction they provide is absent in Allport’s original writings on IR. Therefore, we predicted that IR should have stronger relation with SDT’s concept of internalized extrinsic motivation than with SDT’s concept of intrinsic motivation (Hypothesis 2).

Third, Allport’s description of ER indicates that it represents a form of extrinsic motivation as defined within SDT: religiosity as a means to achieve outcomes separable from the activity itself (i.e., security and affiliation). Although it is clear that Allport’s ER reflects extrinsic motivation, it is less clear whether it represents a more internalized or a more controlled type of extrinsic motivation. On the one hand, it has been argued that with an ER orientation religion is lightly held and “not well integrated in the deeper life of the subject” (Allport 1950:59), suggesting that ER represents a noninternalized form of extrinsic motivation. On the other hand, pressure is not mentioned as a critical component of ER. In fact, Allport (1966:455) even stated that people with this orientation “feel no obligation to attend church regularly” (italics added). Therefore, we do not predict a clear pattern of relations between both Allport’s extrinsic orientations and SDT’s autonomous and controlled regulations (Research Question 1). In contrast to IR being comparable to certain regulations of religious behaviors, we argue that both Allport’s Ep and Es are not comparable with these concepts. Rather, in line with Neyrinck, Lens, and Vansteenkiste (2005), we argue that both extrinsic religious orientations (Ep and Es) describe certain goals that are pursued through religion (instead of motives). In the discussion, we go deeper into this issue.

Basically, if these hypotheses are supported, the implication is that, whereas Allport’s IR is essentially a motivational construct (yet one that encompasses more than just intrinsic motivation as understood in SDT), Allport’s ER orientations are not motivational regulations.

Relating Allport, Batson, and Wulff

Fourth, we expect that Batson’s quest orientation represents a social-cognitive approach to religious contents rather than reflecting a motivational orientation. Therefore, we do not expect
Batson’s quest orientation to relate to SDT’s motivational constructs. If such a zero correlation between Batson’s quest and SDT’s motivational constructs does exist, it implies that Batson’s quest dimension is essentially not a motivational construct. Rather, we expect quest to relate to Wulff’s model. More specifically, as Batson’s quest orientation represents an open exploration of the many different meanings that can be found in religious contents, it seems to involve a flexible and symbolic social-cognitive approach as defined in Wulff’s model (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, pursuant to the discussion in the literature (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993) about whether quest represents a belief or disbelief attitude, we explored the relation between quest and inclusion of transcendence (Research Question 2).

Fifth, given that Allport’s IR includes a strong commitment to religious beliefs (Donahue 1985), we expect a positive correlation between IR and inclusion of transcendence. This association is likely to be more pronounced than the relation between Ep and Es scales and inclusion of transcendence since religion is more lightly held in the case of ER (Hypothesis 4). These four hypotheses and two research questions will be examined in a broad, cross-sectional sample of religiously active participants.

METHOD

Participants

A total of 144 participants from a two-day theological conference in Leuven, Belgium, completed our questionnaire. Sixty-seven participants (47 percent) were male. The mean age of the participants was 53 years old ($SD = 15$), ranging from 21 to 83 years.

Measures

All measures were presented in Dutch, the participants’ native language. All scales were five-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), except the PCBS, which was rated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).

Age Universal I-E Scale-12

Allport’s religious orientations were measured with the 12-item Age Universal I-E Scale (Maltby 1999). Both the eigenvalue >1 criterium and the scree-plot of a principal component analysis (PCA) pointed to a three-component solution (eigenvalues 3.34, 2.30, and 1.32), explaining 58 percent of the variance. Interestingly, after an oblique Promax rotation, only three out of the six IR items loaded on one component. The other three IR items loaded on one component together with the three Ep items. The three Es items clearly constituted the third component. However, for the sake of consistency, we decided to compute our scales as done in the literature. Accordingly, three scales were computed: IR (six items; e.g., “My whole approach to life is based on my religion,” $M = 4.30$, $SD = .54$; Cronbach’s alpha = .70), Ep (three items; e.g., “What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow,” $M = 2.84$, $SD = .83$, alpha = .67), and Es (three items; e.g., “I go to church mostly to spend time with friends,” $M = 2.05$, $SD = .88$, alpha = .85). The IR and Ep scale were positively related: $r(144) = .25$, $p < .01$; also the Ep and Es scale correlated positively: $r(144) = .28$, $p < .01$. IR and Es did not correlate significantly.
Batson’s Quest Orientation

Participants completed the 12-item quest scale of Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993), which contains three subscales, each measured with four items: openness to change (e.g., “As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change”), perception of religious doubt as positive (e.g., “For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious”), and readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity (e.g., “God wasn’t very important to me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of my own life”). A PCA scree-plot pointed to one component (eigenvalue = 3.35), explaining 28 percent of the variance. Accordingly, the 12-item quest scale was computed as the mean of these items ($M = 3.32$, $SD = .52$, alpha = .72). Batson’s quest did not correlate with any of Allport’s religious orientations.

Religious Motivation Scale

Participants were asked to report “the activity that is most helpful in expressing my religious belief attitude” (see Neyrinck et al. 2006 for more details). Examples of listed activities included “reading and discussing religious literature” and “going to church.” Subsequently, participants’ reasons for engaging in each selected activity were assessed, thereby differentiating between intrinsic (three items; e.g., “Because I simply enjoy it”), internalized (three items; e.g., “Because I fully endorse it”), and controlling reasons, that is, a combination of introjected and external regulation (three items; e.g., “Because I would feel guilty if I don’t do so”). Both the scree plot and the eigenvalue >1 criterion of the PCA on these nine items indicated a three-component solution (eigenvalues 2.50, 1.88, and 1.48), explaining 65 percent of the variance. The promax rotated component pattern was clearly interpretable as intrinsic, internalized, and controlled regulation. Accordingly, three scales were computed: intrinsic motivation ($M = 3.80$, $SD = .90$, alpha = .75), internalized regulation ($M = 4.36$, $SD = .54$, alpha = .73), and controlled regulation ($M = 1.73$, $SD = .77$, alpha = .64). Intrinsic motivation and internalized regulation correlated positively [$r(144) = .23, p < .01$], while controlled regulation did not correlate to any other type of regulation.

Postcritical Belief Scale

Participants completed the original Dutch shortened (18-item) PCBS (Duriez, Soenens, and Hutsebaut 2005) measuring four approaches toward religion: literal inclusion (five items; e.g., “I think that Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are written”), symbolic inclusion (four items; e.g., “Despite the high number of injustices Christianity has caused people, the original message of Christ is still valuable to me”), literal exclusion (five items; e.g., “Faith is an expression of a weak personality”), and symbolic exclusion (four items; e.g., “I am well aware my ideology is only one possibility among so many others”). To control for individual differences in acquiescence, the individual average score over all items was subtracted from the raw item scores (for more details on this procedure, see Fontaine et al. 2003). A PCA was then carried out on the corrected scores. A scree test pointed to a two-component solution (eigenvalues 3.82 and 2.38), explaining 36 percent of the variance. After orthogonal Procrustes rotation toward the estimated average structure computed across 16 samples (Fontaine et al. 2003), these two components could be interpreted in terms of (exclusion versus) inclusion of transcendence and a (literal versus) symbolic approach of religious contents. Tucker’s Phi index was .96 for Inclusion and .94 for Symbolic, suggesting good congruence between the sample-specific and the average configuration (Bentler and Bonett 1980; Van de Vijver and Leung 1997). The higher the score on inclusion, the more the Christian message is adhered to. The higher the score on symbolic approach, the more religious contents are processed in a flexible, symbolic fashion. Scores on both components were standardized, hence $M = 0$ and $SD = 1$. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the study variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Orientations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allport’s intrinsic</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>2.67–5.00</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allport’s extrinsic personal</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>1.00–4.67</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allport’s extrinsic social</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>1.00–5.00</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batson’s quest</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>2.08–4.67</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory Styles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic motivation</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.00–5.00</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalized regulation</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>3.00–5.00</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled regulation</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1.00–4.33</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach to Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>−3.48−2.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>−3.13−2.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RESULTS

**Preliminary Analysis**

Descriptive statistics for all study variables (means, standard deviations, observed range, and Cronbach’s alphas) are provided in Table 1. Preliminary analyses were conducted to examine correlations between the study variables with gender and age. A significant multivariate effect of gender was found, Wilk’s Lambda = .83, $F(9,134) = 3.00, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .17$. Females ($M = 3.00, SD = .80$) obtained higher scores on Allport’s Ep in comparison to males, $M = 2.65, SD = .82, F(1,142) = 6.82, p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$. The same gender differences were found for Batson’s quest, females: $M = 3.42, SD = .50$; males: $M = 3.20, SD = .52, F(1,142) = 9.05, p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .05$; and SDT’s intrinsic motivation, females: $M = 3.95, SD = .85$, males: $M = 3.62, SD = .93, F(1,142) = 4.84, p < .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$. Furthermore, age correlated significantly with Allport’s IR, $r(144) = .32, p < .001$; with Batson’s quest, $r(144) = −.20, p < .05$; with SDT’s intrinsic motivation, $r(144) = −.29, p < .001$; and with symbolic approach, $r(144) = −.25, p < .01$. Given these age and gender relations, we controlled for these background variables in the regression analyses.

**Primary Analysis**

**Correlations**

Correlations between the study variables are presented in Table 2. Allport’s IR correlated significantly positively with internalized motivation and inclusion of transcendence. Ep showed a positive relation with intrinsic motivation, internalized motivation, and inclusion. It correlated negatively with symbolic approach. Es correlated positively with both intrinsic motivation and controlled motivation. As predicted in Hypothesis 2, Allport’s IR was significantly correlated with internalized motivation. However, IR did not correlate with intrinsic motivation.

Regarding Research Question 1, both extrinsic scales did not show an interpretable pattern of correlations with the SDT measures. Ep correlated positively with both intrinsic and internalized motivation/regulation, but did not correlate with controlled motivation. Es correlated positively with intrinsic and controlled motivation, but not with internalized regulation. Quest was uncorrelated with any motivational regulation. Instead, it seemed to be a flexible, symbolic attitude
Table 2: Correlations between Allport’s and Batson’s religious orientations based SDT’s types of motivation and Wulff’s social-cognitive approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allport Intrinsic Religious Orientation</th>
<th>Allport Extrinsic Personal Orientation</th>
<th>Allport Extrinsic Social Orientation</th>
<th>Batson Quest Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic motivation</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalized motivation</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled motivation</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of transcendence</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>−.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic approach</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>−.17*</td>
<td>−.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

of disbelief, given its positive relation with symbolic and its negative relation with inclusion of transcendence (Research Question 2).

Regression Analyses

To further examine the relation of the three SDT regulations (intrinsic, internalized, and controlled) and the two PCBS dimensions (inclusion and symbolic) with the Allport and Batson constructs, a series of hierarchical regression analyses was performed. First, Allport’s and Batson’s religious orientations were simultaneously regressed on the background variables age and gender and the three SDT-based regulations. Second, the two PCBS dimensions were added as predictors (see Table 3). IR was positively predicted by internalized regulation (see Hypothesis 1) and both PCBS dimensions (inclusion and symbolic). IR was not predicted by intrinsic motivation (Hypothesis 2). Again concerning Research Question 1, none of the predictors were associated with Allport’s Ep. In contrast, Es was found to be significantly predicted by intrinsic motivation and controlled regulation. Finally, consistent with the correlations, Batson’s quest was negatively predicted by inclusion of transcendence (Research Question 2), while being positively predicted by a symbolic approach.

Discussion

The aim of this study was to relate Allport’s concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation and Batson’s quest orientation, both widely recognized within the psychology of religion, to SDT’s motivational regulations and Wulff’s model of cognitive approaches toward religion. By empirically linking these different frameworks, we addressed the more general question of whether Allport’s and Batson’s concepts represent a motivational regulation, a cognitive style, or a mix of both.

Intrinsic Religious Orientation

One of the interesting findings was the rather strong positive relationship between Allport’s IR and fully internalized regulation as conceptualized within SDT. Internalized regulation represents an autonomous form of extrinsic motivation because the reason for and value of the behavior is personally endorsed, yielding willing activity. The positive association between both constructs is in line with Allport’s descriptions of IR as the internalization of religious beliefs and values, through which religion becomes the central motive in one’s life. Although both scales were relatively strongly correlated (i.e., .45), both are characterized by a substantial amount of unique
Table 3: Regression analyses predicting Allport’s and Batson’s religious orientations based SDT’s types of motivation and Wulff’s social-cognitive approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allport Measures</th>
<th>Batson Measure</th>
<th>Quest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intrinsic Religiosity</td>
<td>Extrinsic Personal</td>
<td>Extrinsic Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic motivation</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalized motivation</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlled motivation</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of transcendence</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic approach</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
variance, suggesting that both concepts are similar, yet distinct. Indeed, IR and SDT’s internalized regulation are similar in the sense that both are integrated into one’s self-structures, yet they differ with respect to the content that gets integrated. In IR, religious contents are personally subscribed to and fully endorsed; in internalized regulation, the regulation or value for performing a religious behavior is fully accepted and integrated. That IR yielded a unique positive relation with inclusion of transcendence is further evidence that IR involves the valuation of religious contents. Just as inclusion measures the degree of adherence to Christian religious contents, Allport’s IR also measures the strength of religious belief, next to motivation for religiosity or religious behaviors.

Intriguingly, in contrast to the strong positive correlation between Allport’s concept of IR and internalized regulation, we found that Allport’s IR was unrelated to SDT’s concept of intrinsic motivation. Within SDT, intrinsic motivation refers to engaging in religious behavior for the mere satisfaction it provides. Our finding essentially suggests that Allport’s IR has more to do with the personal endorsement of religious activities and with the personal valuation of religiosity (i.e., identification) than with inherent enjoyment of religious activities per se. However, several other elements might explain the null relation between IR and intrinsic motivation. First, although Gorsuch (1997) described IR in terms of intrinsic motivation, Allport himself did not do so. Since Allport did not describe IR in terms of inherent satisfaction or interest, it seems logical that IR is less strongly related to intrinsic motivation compared to internalized motivation, as we had hypothesized. Second, with respect to the operationalization of IR, only one item in Allport’s IR scale (i.e., “I enjoy reading about my religion”) pertains to the enjoyment of a religious activity, whereas all other items refer to the personal endorsement of one’s religious beliefs. Given the imbalance in the IR items tapping into satisfaction and enjoyment versus personal valuation of religion, it is logical that IR is more strongly related to internalized than to intrinsic motivation, as formulated within SDT.

In addition, because this study is the first to examine these relationships, it seems premature to draw any conclusions from the lack of relation between IR and intrinsic motivation. This issue deserves further investigation. What can be concluded, however, is that the term “intrinsic” in Allport’s IR refers to the full acceptance and endorsement of one’s religious contents, which from an SDT perspective would be labeled as internalized, an autonomous form of extrinsic motivation.

A final question with respect to IR is whether it also represents a particular cognitive style of dealing with religious contents. Our research shows that IR was positively related to a symbolic approach toward religious contents, suggesting that IR also includes a more flexible approach to religious issues. Overall, these findings thus point out that Allport’s IR might represent a mix of (a) a religious belief orientation (as it correlates with inclusion), (b) an internalized regulation for religion to religious behaviors, and (c) a flexible, symbolic interpretation of belief contents. However, our correlational findings do not exclude the possibility that Allport’s IR construct primarily taps into a motivational orientation that goes along with a stronger adherence to religious contents and a more flexible approach toward religious contents rather than representing a cognitive style per se (see Neyrinck et al. 2006 for a similar argument). Finally, it is interesting to note that the positive relation between Allport’s IR and a symbolic approach contradicts Batson and associates’ (1993) suggestion that an intrinsic believer is compulsive, conservative, and uncritical (see also Herek 1987). Of course, a replication of this study in a more diverse sample, including a wider range of literal and symbolic believers, is warranted. Moreover, a high score of IR in a subsample of more literal believers would indicate the internalization of more conservative religious contents. Related to this, we need to acknowledge that our sample was rather homogenous. In fact, the standard deviation of some of our measures was not high, calling into question the magnitude of the correlations of these same measures. To address these issues more thoroughly, more research in a more diverse sample would be welcome.
Extrinsic Religious Orientation

The significant correlations between Ep and Es and the motivational regulations within SDT were less straightforward to interpret than the relation between IR and internalized regulation. For instance, Es was found to be predicted by both intrinsic motivation and controlled regulation, suggesting that the pursuit of social contact through religion might be undergirded by several quite different reasons. Religion is lightly held in an extrinsic religious orientation, pointing to a noninternalized regulation for religious behaviors. However, given Allport’s (1966) view that an extrinsic religious person does not experience any obligation to engage in religious activities, the data are inconclusive. Whereas Ep is not predicted by controlled regulation, Es is positively related to controlled regulation. Bottom line, these findings point to an empirical divergence between Allport’s ER and SDT’s regulations, which we theoretically predicted.

A similar point was made by Neyrinck, Lens, and Vansteenkiste (2005), who argued that both Allport’s Ep and Es cannot clearly be placed in the SDT framework of regulations of behavior. Both extrinsic religious orientations refer to certain goal contents pursued through religion rather than to motives. One tries to find a certain form of security or comfort in religion, or religion serves the goal of social affiliation. In SDT, a clear distinction is made between the regulations of behaviors (i.e., motives) and the goals that are pursued through activities. Specifically, in SDT a distinction is made between two types of goals (Vansteenkiste, Lens, and Deci 2006), that is, intrinsic goals (e.g., self-development, affiliation, or community contribution) and extrinsic goals (e.g., financial success, fame, and physical attractiveness). Importantly, the regulations of certain behaviors and the goal contents pursued through those behaviors are conceptualized to be relatively orthogonal (Sheldon et al. 2004). Hence, going to church to attain social affiliation (i.e., an intrinsic goal) can be regulated autonomously or controlled, just like one can feel free or obligated to contribute to the community by donating money. Following Neyrinck, Lens, and Vansteenkiste (2005), Allport’s IR can be conceptualized as autonomous behavioral regulations, while both Ep and Es can be framed as goal pursuits.

In our opinion, this answers the “thorny issue” of bipolarity or orthogonality of IR and ER. From an SDT perspective, both are rather orthogonal as they pertain to different motivational concepts (i.e., reasons and goals), which is fully in line with several empirical studies (e.g., Kirkpatrick 1989). Furthermore, regarding the question of whether Allport’s religious orientations would measure cognitive styles, we found that both ER scales were not clearly related to cognitive styles in approaching religious contents. Surprisingly, both extrinsic religious orientations were unrelated to inclusion of transcendence. This further attests to the point that “religion is lightly held” in this orientation.

Batson’s Quest Orientation

Regarding Batson’s quest orientation, our findings clearly indicate this is a measure of cognitive style instead of a motivational construct. As expected, the quest scale did not relate to motivational regulations, suggesting that it is not motivational in nature. Also as expected, it correlated positively with a symbolic rather than literal approach to religious contents. Interestingly, this scale was also negatively related to inclusion of transcendence. Together, these findings suggest that a quest orientation reflects an orientation of symbolic disbelief. This agrees with Donahue’s (1985) concerns about quest measuring disbelief, and it can be seen as evidence against Batson’s claim of quest indeed measuring a religious orientation. Here one sees the advantage of including the PCBS measure to disentangle belief and unbelief. Of course, this first finding relating quest and disbelief awaits empirical replication.
CONCLUSION

It was our intention to underline Kirkpatrick and Hood’s (1990:448) point that “a serious approach to researching the topic of motivation for religious involvement...should begin with a rich psychological theory of human motivation.” Psychologists of religion need to reduce the distance from mainstream theoretical and empirical psychology. Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) suggest further that religious orientation items be dropped, replacing them with new items based on validated theoretical frameworks. We believe the qualitatively more differentiated SDT-based regulations of religious behaviors do so, just like Wulff’s model with qualitatively different styles of (dis)belief does. As we have shown, these frameworks can be meaningfully compared with Allport’s model.

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